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A R T I C L E S
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Nathan Richardson and Arthur G . Fraas are a resident scholar 
and visiting scholar, respectively, at Resources for the Future .
Summary
Over the last half-decade, a variety of federal legis-
lative proposals for limiting greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions have been put forward, most of which 
would set a price on carbon . As of early 2013, the one 
politically plausible policy appears to be a carbon tax, 
passed as part of a larger fiscal reform package . Mean-
while, the U .S . Environmental Protection Agency has 
begun regulating GHG emissions from a variety of 
sources using its authority under the Clean Air Act . 
It may be necessary to choose between these two poli-
cies, however . The Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade 
bill that failed in 2009 would have preempted much 
of this authority, and it appears likely that a carbon 
tax law would do the same . But how can one make 
this choice?
Over the last half-decade, a variety of federal legisla-tive proposals for limiting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been put forward, with varying 
levels of enthusiasm in the U .S . Congress, the policy com-
munity, and among the public . Those proposals that would 
set a price on carbon—a GHG cap-and-trade system or a 
carbon tax—are most favored by economists, but others, 
like clean energy standards, have at one time or another 
been the policy du jour . As of today, the most politically 
plausible pricing policy appears to be a carbon tax, passed 
as part of a larger fiscal reform package .
Over the same period, and especially under President 
Barack Obama after 2008, an alternative vehicle for cli-
mate policy has emerged—U .S . Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) regulation authorized by the Clean Air Act 
(CAA) .1 Regulation of road vehicles has been strengthened 
to limit GHG emissions . Other regulation has been for-
mally proposed for new power plants and is under con-
sideration for existing power plants and, perhaps, other 
emitting sectors . The possible impact of this regulation 
on U .S . GHG emissions is significant . Research suggests 
that, along with reductions already taking place because 
of market factors—especially the post-2008 recession and 
recent low prices of natural gas—CAA regulation may be 
sufficient to reach the president’s goal of 17% emissions 
reductions over 2005 levels by 2020, as stated in Copen-
hagen in 2010 .2
This regulatory pathway is unpopular in Congress, with 
Republicans and even some Democrats actively seeking 
to block specific regulations or to adopt legislation strip-
ping EPA of climate-related authority . Many greens, on 
the other hand, argue that new federal climate policy (like 
a carbon tax) is compatible with parallel CAA regulation 
and that existing authority should be preserved .
Congress may or may not pass new climate legislation, 
and it may or may not pass legislation limiting EPA author-
ity under the CAA . This results in four possibilities for 





mostly left intact 
No new climate 
legislation
1. No federal climate 
policy
2. EPA regulates under 




3. Carbon price 
supplants EPA 
regulation
4. Parallel EPA regula-
tion and carbon 
price
1 . 42 U .S .C . §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat . CAA §§101-618 .
2 . Dallas Burtraw & Matt Woerman, U .S . Status on Climate Change Mitiga-
tion, RFF Discussion Paper 12-48 (Oct . 2012), available at http://www .rff .
org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails .aspx?PublicationID=22073 .
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In the first and fourth scenarios, it is not necessary to 
compare the merits of the two options—you have both, 
or you have neither, so no choice is necessary .3 But the sec-
ond and third scenarios set up a choice . Will such a choice 
be necessary? The outcome of negotiations over any leg-
islation, especially in an area as politically contentious as 
climate, is very hard to predict . This is especially true for 
us—we are not political experts . But evidence suggests that 
the second and third scenarios are more likely .
Proposals to simply strip EPA authority have failed, 
despite some support . Some proposals for new carbon 
legislation would not preempt CAA authority, but by far 
the most successful such proposal to date—the Waxman-
Markey cap-and-trade bill that passed the U .S . House of 
Representatives in 2009—would have preempted most 
of EPA’s climate-related authority . These events lead us 
to conclude that either the status quo or new legislation 
partially or completely preempting the CAA (as applied to 
GHGs) are the most politically plausible outcomes .
If this is right, then a choice between the two policies 
will be necessary . But how can one make this choice? What 
are the key questions and issues to consider? The purpose 
of this Article is to compare these policies . Even if one 
disagrees with our assumption that a choice between the 
policy pathways is politically necessary, this comparison 
remains a relevant, though not complete, analysis of the 
plausible outcomes .
Both policies are aimed at the same problem: reducing 
emissions that contribute to climate change . Economists 
have long argued that pricing an externality is the most 
cost-effective way to deal with it, so replacing an ostensi-
bly inferior instrument (traditional regulatory tools) with 
a carbon price is appealing . But the CAA is not as poor 
a fit for climate policy as is commonly believed . It is also 
not monolithic—the statute includes many tools aimed at 
different kinds of emissions sources . A combination of a 
carbon price and EPA regulation, as would have existed 
had Waxman-Markey passed, is possible . Moreover, any 
carbon price passed by Congress will inevitably require 
compromises that take it away from blackboard ideals . As 
a result, whether the existing policy pathway should be 
traded for a new one is a valid question . The right answer 
greatly depends on the details of a new policy and of what, 
exactly, is being given up .
Also, no proposed carbon legislation currently has 
broad support, and significant parts of EPA’s regula-
tory plans under the CAA remain unknown . In other 
words, we do not have two concrete, well-defined pro-
posals to compare .
3 . However, it is true that the fourth scenario—coexistence—requires careful 
analysis of interactions between the two policies, some of which would be 
similar to the comparative analysis presented here .
Our aim in this Article is therefore not to determine 
whether a trade of policies is wise or unwise . Instead, our 
intention is to give policymakers, stakeholders, and other 
interested readers an impartial assessment of both poli-
cies and, in particular, the features that are important to 
a comparative evaluation . In other words, we will not give 
answers, but hope at least to give the right questions to ask .
To do this, we first briefly outline the competing poli-
cies .4 Next, we describe how a policy trade might happen, 
drawing on one available example—the 2009 Waxman-
Markey cap-and-trade bill . Finally, we discuss the relative 
merits of the two policy pathways, with particular empha-
sis on what aspects of a proposed carbon price and the as-
yet-undetermined parts of an EPA-led approach are most 
important to that comparison .
I. Climate Policy Under Existing 
Legislation
The CAA, as first passed in the 1970s and amended most 
recently in 1990, is the primary federal vehicle for regu-
lation of air pollution and arguably the most significant 
statute in American environmental law . It is a complex law, 
with many regulatory schemes aimed at different types of 
pollutants emitted from different classes of sources . Con-
gress delegates significant authority in the Act to EPA, not 
only over implementation and enforcement, but also over 
the scope of regulation itself . As an expert Agency, EPA is 
required to regularly reassess threats to health and welfare 
from air pollution, and to modify its regulations as neces-
sary . This includes the authority to regulate new pollutants 
as their effects become known .
Until quite recently, the view that this authority extended 
to regulation of GHGs based on their climate effects was 
confined to a minority in the legal and policy communi-
ties . Under the George W . Bush Administration, EPA itself 
disavowed authority to regulate GHGs under the Act . In 
the mid-2000s, some states and environmental groups 
sued EPA, challenging this view, and eventually prevailed 
in Massachusetts v. EPA .5 The U .S . Supreme Court held in 
Massachusetts that GHGs are pollutants within the defini-
tion of the CAA, opening the door to regulation .
Under President Obama, EPA has moved to limit GHG 
emissions from a variety of sources . Briefly describing these 
actions is useful for understanding not only the current 
state of GHG regulation, but also the varied set of tools 
available under the statute, any or all of which might be 
preempted by new climate legislation .
4 . Note that here we only compare the CAA to new legislation setting a carbon 
price, not to alternative policies, like a clean energy standard .
5 . 549 U .S . 497, 37 ELR 20075, 37 ELR 20075 (2007) .
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A. Road Vehicles
Title II of the CAA gives EPA extensive authority to reg-
ulate emissions from vehicles, or “mobile sources .” EPA 
first moved to limit GHG emissions from on-road cars 
and trucks, driven in part by the fact that the parties in 
Massachusetts were specifically seeking such regulation . 
In late 2009, the Agency issued final “endangerment” and 
“cause/contribute” findings . The former identified GHGs 
as a threat to human health and welfare and is the trig-
ger and basis for all subsequent GHG regulation under 
the Act . The latter identified road vehicles as a source of 
significant GHG emissions . Together, these actions pro-
vide the basis for the regulation of GHG emissions from 
road vehicles .
Since 2009, EPA and the U .S . Department of Trans-
portation have issued stringent new revised corporate aver-
age fuel economy (CAFE) standards for light-duty vehicles 
through the 2025 model year (MY) and for heavy-duty 
vehicles through the 2018 MY . These standards require 
manufacturers to improve the fuel economy of vehicles 
they produce . Light-duty vehicles are to achieve up to an 
average of 54 .5 miles per gallon (mpg) for vehicles pro-
duced in 2025, with a projected reduction in lifetime GHG 
emissions for MY 2012 to 2025 of around three billion 
metric tons .6
B. Electric Generation
Title I of the CAA gives EPA a variety of tools with which 
to regulate emissions from “stationary sources .” Fossil 
fuel-fired power plants comprise by far the largest class of 
emitters in this group (and in the U .S . economy) . EPA has 
moved to regulate GHG emissions from these sources as 
well, though it has done so more deliberately than for the 
transportation sector . Newly constructed and/or upgraded 
sources face different regulations than existing, unmodi-
fied sources .
1. New Source Review
All significant new emissions sources are required to 
undergo “new source review” (NSR) under the CAA . This 
process requires operators to show that they have installed 
“best available control technology” (BACT), a determina-
tion made on a case-by-case basis . Beginning in January 
2011, EPA has required operators to show that they are 
using BACT for GHG emissions as well as “conventional” 
pollutants like sulfur dioxide (SO2) . This regulation was 
challenged on a variety of legal grounds, but in 2012, the 
6 . U .S . EPA, Office of Transportation and Air Quality, EPA and NHTSA Fi-
nalize Historic National Program to Reduce Greenhouse Gases and Improve 
Fuel Economy for Cars and Trucks, EPA-420-F-10-014 (Apr . 2010), available 
at http://www .epa .gov/otaq/climate/regulations/420f10014 .pdf; U .S . EPA, 
Office of Transportation and Air Quality, EPA and NHTSA Set Standards 
to Reduce Greenhouse Gases and Improve Fuel Economy for Model Years 2017-
2025 Cars and Light Trucks, EPA-420-F-12-051 (Aug . 2012), available at 
http://www .epa .gov/otaq/climate/documents/420f12051 .pdf .
U .S . Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D .C .) 
Circuit upheld the rule .
2. Title V Operating Permits
Emitters are also required to obtain operating permits 
under Title V of the CAA . These impose no additional 
requirements, but rather consolidate existing require-
ments, including those applicable to GHG emissions, into 
a single permit .
3. New Source Performance Standards
EPA may also issue new source performance standards 
(NSPS) under §111 of the CAA . These standards impose 
minimum national performance criteria for all sources in 
a given category . In practice, they operate as a floor for the 
case-by-case NSR process . In late 2010, EPA committed 
to issue NSPS for GHG emissions from power plants in a 
settlement agreement with several states . In 2012, it issued 
(and in 2013 revised) a formal proposal for most classes of 
new fossil fuel plants, setting a standard that can be met 
only by natural gas plants or by coal plants with carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) technology . The effect of this 
proposal would be to ban construction of new coal plants 
without CCS .7
4. Existing Source Performance Standards
Neither of these regulatory programs (NSR and NSPS) 
affect existing plants, unless those plants undergo major 
modifications that trigger the NSR process . For existing 
sources, the president has directed EPA to lead a process, 
under §111(d) of the CAA, in which states will issue exist-
ing source performance standards (ESPS) . This provision 
of the Act has only rarely been used, and EPA has yet to 
propose any guidelines for such standards, despite having 
committed to do so by mid-2012 in the 2010 settlement 
agreement . In mid-2013, however, President Obama com-
mitted EPA to propose §111(d) guidelines by June 2014 
and finalize them by June 2015, with states to be given 
until June 2016 to submit their implementation plans (that 
is the details of how they will regulate) .8 As of this writing, 
EPA appears on schedule to meet this latest commitment .9
Legal and economic analysis indicates that EPA could 
create a relatively flexible set of ESPS with achievable emis-
sions targets and a trading system to reduce costs .10
7 . This prohibition takes effect even before the rule is finalized, though EPA 
could in principle withdraw or alter the ban before that point .
8 . See Presidential Memorandum—Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards,
June 25, 2013, available at http://www .whitehouse .gov/the-press-office/
2013/06/25/presidential-memorandum-power-sector-carbon-pollution-
standards .
9 . See Andrew Childers, EPA Proposal to Regulate Carbon Dioxide From Exist-
ing Plants Under OMB Review, Daily Env’t Rep ., Apr . 2, 2014, available at 
http://www .bna .com/epa-proposal-regulate-n17179889328/ .
10 . See Nathan Richardson et al ., Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Clean 
Air Act: Structure, Effects, and Implications of a Knowable Pathway, RFF 
Discussion Paper 10-23 (Apr . 2010), available at http://www .rff .org/News/
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Because of the amount of emissions from existing 
sources and the range of regulatory options available, EPA’s 
decisions on power-sector ESPS are the most significant it 
will make in regulating GHGs under the CAA .
C. Other Sectors and Tools
Transportation and electric power are by far the largest-
emitting sectors of the U .S . economy, so it is natural for 
EPA to have focused its regulatory efforts on these sectors . 
The CAA, however, gives the Agency much broader author-
ity . In its 2010 settlement agreement, the Agency commit-
ted to issue NSPS and ESPS for the refining sector as well 
as for fossil electric power . The Agency has not fulfilled this 
commitment and shows no signs of doing so soon, but it 
unambiguously has the power to do so, not only for refin-
ing, but for many other sectors that emit GHGs . Iron and 
steel, cement, chemicals, and other manufacturing sectors 
are the most obvious candidates .
EPA also has authority to regulate emissions from parts 
of the transportation sector other than road vehicles . 
Aviation, shipping, and “nonroad” land vehicles are all 
regulated under the CAA, and these regulations could be 
extended or expanded to cover GHG emissions .
The CAA also includes other regulatory tools for sta-
tionary (and, in some cases, other) sources; these tools 
have not been considered good fits for GHG regulation 
but could, in principle, be used in the future . EPA could 
classify GHGs as “criteria pollutants” and impose national 
Features/Pages/Greenhouse-Gas-Regulation-under-the-Clean-Air-Act-
Structure-Effects-and-Implications-of-a-Knowable-Pathway .aspx .
ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) under §110 of the 
Act, as it has done with the six conventional pollutants 
(e .g ., lead, SO2, and ozone) . It could also designate GHGs 
“hazardous air pollutants” under §112 or attempt to regu-
late them under §115, a relatively obscure provision target-
ing international emissions . EPA also has authority under 
Title VI of the CAA to regulate pollutants that affect the 
ozone layer, some of which are also GHGs .
Table 1 shows the most significant climate-related regu-
latory options under the CAA and their current status .
D. Other Environmental Statutes
Though it is by far the most important, the CAA is not 
the only environmental statute that grants (or could be 
interpreted to grant) regulatory authority based on risks 
from climate change . For example, species threatened 
by climate-related habitat disruption could, in principle, 
qualify for protection under the Endangered Species 
Act,11 though the current Administration has disavowed 
the use of that statute as a vehicle for climate regulation . 
Under some theories, this would give regulators authority 
to impose emissions restrictions . The Clean Water Act12 
might grant similar authority to the extent that carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions threaten U .S . waters with acidifi-
cation . Although it is not possible to describe and evaluate 
these extra-CAA regulatory possibilities here,13 it is likely 
that they will at least be considered in negotiations over 
new climate legislation .
11 . 16 U .S .C . §§1531-1544, ELR Stat . ESA §§2-18 .
12 . 33 U .S .C . §§1251-1387, ELR Stat . FWPCA §§101-607 .
13 . See Peter Anderson, Climate Change Regulatory Authority Beyond the Clean 
Air Act, RFF Discussion Paper 12-39 (July 2012), available at http://www .
rff .org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-12-39 .pdf .
Table 1. Primary Climate-Related Regulatory Options Under the CAA
Program Sources covered CAA § Status
Mobile sources
Fuel economy stds. (CAFE) Light-duty motor vehicles §202 Final
Heavy-duty motor vehicles §202 Final
Emissions stds. Aviation §231 Unknown
Maritime and nonroad §213 Unknown
Stationary sources
New source review (NSR) permits Large new sources in all sectors §165 Final
Title V operating permits Large existing sources in all sectors Title V Final
New source performance stds. (NSPS) New fossil power plants §111 Proposed
New oil/gas refineries §111 Promised
New/modified sources in other sectors §111 Unknown
Existing source performance stds. (ESPS) Existing fossil power plants §111(d) Promised
Existing oil/gas refineries §111(d) Promised
All other stationary sectors §111(d) Unknown
Other
National ambient air quality stds. (NAAQS) All sectors §110 Unlikely
Hazardous air pollutant (HAP) regs. All stationary sectors §112 Unlikely
Stratospheric ozone pollutant regs. All emitters Title VI Unknown
International pollutant regs. All emitters §115 Unlikely
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II. New Legislation: Putting a Price on 
Carbon
The classic approach economists use to address externali-
ties, like the climate change effects of carbon emissions, 
is to incorporate the cost of the externality in commod-
ity prices . The incorporation of a carbon price confronts 
the users/consumers with the cost of the external dam-
ages associated with production of the commodity so 
that they reduce their consumption of carbon-producing 
goods . It also provides producers with an incentive to find 
ways to reduce the carbon emissions arising from their 
production of the commodity . As one scholar puts it, “[c]
arbon pricing is the only signal that can cut through the 
noise and direct diverse economic actors toward smart, 
green investments .”14
One can create a carbon price using either of two 
approaches: impose a carbon tax; or create a market for 
emissions (e .g ., through a cap-and-trade program) . The 
failed Waxman-Markey legislation (discussed below)—
which was adopted by the House, but never reached a 
vote in the U .S . Senate in 2009—would have established 
a cap-and-trade program . An alternative to Waxman-
Markey introduced in the Senate by Sens . Maria Cantwell 
(D-Wash .) and Susan Collins (R-Maine)—the Carbon 
Limits and Energy for America’s Renewal Act—would 
have set up an auction mechanism for selling “carbon 
shares” to fuel producers .15
In February 2013, Sens . Barbara Boxer (D-Cal .) and 
Bernie Sanders (I-Vt .) proposed a bill to tax carbon emis-
sions . The bill would tax emissions of the economy’s largest 
upstream fossil fuel producers—coal mines, oil refiner-
ies, and natural gas-processing plants—but it would not 
directly include electricity-generating plants that would 
continue to be regulated by EPA (though fossil plants 
would be exposed to the tax indirectly through fuel prices) . 
The carbon tax would initially be set at $20 per ton of 
CO2-equivalent and would increase by 5 .6% per year over 
a 10-year period . According to the sponsors, the bill would 
raise $1 .2 trillion in revenues by 2020 .
The adoption of a carbon tax has emerged as an increas-
ingly attractive approach—at least within some circles—as 
a way to kill two birds with one stone . Not only would 
it establish a price for carbon, but it could also provide a 
source of federal government revenue to address a growing 
14 . See Michael A . Livermore, Unlocking the Green Economy, Institute for 
Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law Policy, Brief No . 
2 (2008) at 1, http://policyintegrity .org/publications/detail/unlocking-the-
green-economy/ (last visited May 2, 2014) .
15 . Note that, unlike Waxman-Markey itself, this bill would not have preempt-
ed EPA authority under the CAA .
federal budget deficit—particularly with the substantial 
projected growth in entitlement expenditures . Alterna-
tively, a carbon tax could be structured to replace more 
regressive taxes (e .g ., a payroll tax) or taxes that retard capi-
tal investment and the formation of small business (e .g ., 
corporate or business taxes) .
III. Waxman-Markey: An Example Trade
Because the CAA is modular, whether to exchange exist-
ing authority for new legislation is complex . All parts of 
the statute need not be preempted, and creative trades 
that divide authority over various sectors between existing 
CAA regulation and a new carbon price mechanism are 
possible, at least in principle . This part describes one such 
trade, though, of course, many others are possible, up to 
and including full preemption of CAA authority to regu-
late based on climate risks .
The 2009 Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade bill (H .R . 
2454) narrowly passed the House . No parallel measure 
passed the Senate, and therefore no bill reached the presi-
dent’s desk . Nevertheless, the bill does represent the high 
watermark (to date) for climate legislation, and is therefore 
a useful model . As noted above, the bill would have cre-
ated a comprehensive cap-and-trade system covering most 
U .S . GHG emissions, and also would have stripped EPA of 
much—but not all—of its existing climate-related author-
ity under the CAA .
Specifically, Waxman-Markey would have eliminated 
EPA authority to consider GHG emissions in the NSR pro-
cess, to regulate GHGs as criteria or hazardous pollutants, 
to regulate GHGs based on their international effects, and 
to issue GHG performance standards (NSPS and ESPS) 
for sources subject to the emissions cap .16 It would have 
preserved EPA authority to issue performance standards 
for relatively minor classes of sources not subject to the cap . 
More importantly, EPA also would have retained authority 
to regulate transportation-sector emissions with fuel econ-
omy standards . CAFE regulation would have continued to 
require vehicles to meet fleet average standards, though the 
cap-and-trade system would have included emissions of the 
upstream producers/importers of petroleum fuels—with 
downstream effects on fuel prices . Table 2 shows the status 
of climate-related regulatory options under the CAA had 
Waxman-Markey become law .
16 . The bill would have imposed performance standards, set specifically by 
statute, on coal plants—but only after CCS technology had been com-
mercially demonstrated .
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Whether any future trade of existing CAA authority for 
carbon price legislation would follow similar lines is impos-
sible to know . Since 2010, much has been learned about 
regulatory options under the existing act as EPA has moved 
to actually use its authority . This has increased anxiety and 
opposition among many in industry, but has also endeared 
many environmental groups to CAA climate authority . 
Both sides’ positions therefore appear to have become more 
entrenched, though public statements likely reflect bar-
gaining positions rather than truly held views .
The Waxman-Markey policy trade does illustrate two 
important points, however . First, the modular character of 
the CAA makes partial trades possible . Second, the more 
politically popular a CAA program is, the less likely it is to 
be sacrificed in a bargain for climate legislation .
IV. Advantages and Disadvantages
Up to this point, we have merely described these two policy 
options—new carbon legislation and CAA regulation . But 
evaluating an exchange (or negotiating one) requires direct 
comparisons of their relative merits . To that end, this part 
discusses the relative advantages and disadvantages of the 
two policies in a variety of areas .
Generally, we assume that the goal of any climate policy 
is to achieve a specified emissions reduction at the lowest 
cost (or the greatest emissions reduction at a specified cost), 
regardless of what sector—or even what country—those 
reductions come from . But, as the following discussion 
shows, there are other dimensions to consider in addition 
to the economic cost of making reductions . Administrative 
costs and political risk can vary, and policies that look good 
in the short term may be inferior over the long term .
Also, a climate policy may have other goals: reducing 
emissions from a particular sector, reducing domestic emis-
sions only, encouraging renewable energy or demand-side 
energy efficiency, or enabling progress in international 
negotiations, for example . We mention these where rel-
evant, but our ultimate focus is on a policy’s ability to 
achieve the lowest-cost GHG emissions reductions .
A. General Cost-Effectiveness
The consensus view among economists is that the most 
cost-effective policy for addressing externalities is to put a 
price on them . In the GHG context, this can be achieved 
either by setting a price explicitly, as a carbon tax would do, 
or by establishing a market-based approach like a cap-and-
trade system . Economists often contrast a price approach 
with traditional “command-and-control” regulation, of 
which the CAA is often given as an example .
The superior cost-effectiveness (defined as cost per unit 
of emissions reduction) of externality pricing is in large 
part due to information asymmetry . Regulators (or, more 
broadly, government) set the cap or price, but producers 
and consumers have better information about how emis-
sions can most cheaply be reduced in production and 
consumption of goods and services . Resulting changes in 
the prices of goods and services lead consumers to adjust 
their purchases by substituting away from higher priced, 
carbon-intensive goods . Pricing the externality harnesses 
market forces to achieve the most cost-effective reductions, 
rather than relying on regulators’ best estimates . The sheer 
scope of GHG regulation makes flexible, cost-effective 
approaches extremely important .
Table 2. Climate-Related Regulatory Options Under the CAA With Waxman-Markey
Program Sources covered CAA § Status
Mobile sources
Fuel economy stds. (CAFE) Light-duty motor vehicles §202 Retained
Heavy-duty motor vehicles §202 Retained
Emissions stds. Aviation §231 Retained
Maritime and nonroad §213 Retained
Stationary sources
New source review (NSR) permits Large new sources in all sectors §165 Preempted
Title V operating permits Large existing sources in all sectors Title V Preempted
New source performance stds. (NSPS) New sources in capped sectors §111 Preempted
New sources in uncapped sectors §111 Modified
Existing source performance stds. (ESPS) Existing sources in capped sectors §111(d) Preempted
Existing sources in uncapped sectors Modified
Other
National ambient air quality stds. (NAAQS) All sectors §110 Preempted
Hazardous air pollutant (HAP) regs. All stationary sectors §112 Preempted
Stratospheric ozone pollutant regs. All emitters Title VI Modified
International pollutant regs. All emitters §115 Preempted
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Past experience has shown that market-based approaches 
can achieve emissions reductions at significantly lower cost 
than initially estimated, and that such approaches could be 
much more cost-effective than traditional regulation under 
the CAA .
This comparison assumes that the CAA is inflexible . 
In some ways, this is true . Many of the tools available to 
EPA under the CAA are relatively rigid, and require EPA 
to invest significant technical resources to estimate achiev-
able targets . For example, air quality standards (NAAQS) 
are, by definition, nationally uniform—the same stan-
dards apply everywhere regardless of how costly it is to 
achieve them . Some programs can even create perverse 
incentives—NSR, for example, may discourage firms from 
upgrading older, less-efficient facilities because doing so 
would trigger an expensive permit process . Technology-
based standards, like NSPS, that effectively mandate a 
specific control technology, at least as traditionally imple-
mented, can stall innovation because of the limited incen-
tive to make further technological improvements .
But the CAA is not as inflexible as it is often character-
ized . At least some examples of market-based environmen-
tal regulation—on which the reputation of such tools for 
cost-effectiveness is based—are, in fact, CAA programs . 
The SO2 cap-and-trade system created by Title IV of the 
Act and, to a lesser extent, nitrogen oxide (NOx) trading 
programs created under the NAAQS provisions are both 
viewed as cost-effective success stories . To be fair, Con-
gress explicitly and uniquely crafted the Title IV program, 
and the NOx programs were built under CAA provisions 
(NAAQS) that are very unlikely to be applied to GHGs . 
Also, some court decisions have sharply limited the flexibil-
ity of these programs,17 though the Supreme Court’s recent 
holding in EPA v. EME Homer City appears to signal better 
future prospects for flexibility, at least under NAAQS .18
Nevertheless, significant regulatory flexibility appears to 
be available to the Agency in those programs that will con-
stitute the core of a CAA-driven approach to GHG regu-
lation . In the transportation sector, new CAFE standards 
for MYs to 2025 are calibrated to vehicle size (preserving 
consumer choice) and allow trading among manufactur-
ers (probably reducing costs and increasing incentives to 
become more efficient) .19 Legal analysis indicates that the 
Agency could also pursue flexible, market-based regulation 
for aviation emissions .20
Most importantly, EPA appears to have broad author-
ity to implement flexible, market-based performance stan-
dards for ESPS . Legal analysis indicates that the Agency, 
17 . Because the Title IV program was explicitly set out by Congress, the court 
found, in its recent Clean Air Interstate Rule decision, that EPA could not 
alter the program as a part of its efforts to achieve further reductions in 
SO2 emissions . In addition, recent court decisions severely constrain any 
interstate trading program—like the NOx trading program or the Clean Air 
Interstate Rule—set up under the requirements of NAAQS .
18 . Environmental Protection Agency v . EME Homer City Generation, 572 
U .S . __ (2014)
19 . The trading is authorized by separate statute .
20 . See Nathan Richardson, Aviation, Carbon, and the Clean Air Act, 38 Col . J . 
Envtl . L . 67 (2013) .
working in concert with states, can implement a trad-
able performance standard or perhaps even a form of cap 
and trade with its authority under this part of the CAA .21 
Indeed the Bush EPA attempted to implement a cap-and-
trade system for mercury emissions using the same author-
ity in 2005, though courts struck down that effort for 
unrelated reasons . Economic analysis indicates that such 
flexible regulation (a tradable standard) could result in 
overall cost savings of two-thirds over a similarly stringent 
inflexible approach .22
Because ESPS will be the primary regulatory tool for the 
largest-emitting sector of the economy (fossil fuel electric 
power), using flexible tools here will have major impacts on 
the cost-effectiveness of CAA climate policy . Because the 
Agency has yet to propose ESPS for any sector, whether it 
will actually adopt a flexible approach is unclear . But it has 
the option to do so .
There are limits, however . EPA’s ability to allow emis-
sions trading between sectors is unclear, and even if doing 
so is legal, technical barriers may prevent it in practice . 
The Agency also may not be able to include some flexible 
compliance options, like credits for renewable generation 
or demand-side energy efficiency or emissions offsets that 
would be possible under new carbon legislation .23 Further, 
because the Agency would need to set sector- or subsector-
level emissions targets, this approach remains information-
intensive relative to an approach that sets a uniform national 
carbon price . Once relatively obvious “low-hanging fruit” 
opportunities for emissions reductions are identified and 
exploited, it will become more difficult for EPA to avoid 
costly missteps . Perverse incentives from NSR could also 
erode the benefits of flexible ESPS if interactions between 
the two are not addressed .24
As we have stated in the past,25 our research indicates 
that, contrary to commonly held views, the CAA can be 
a flexible and cost-effective tool for GHG regulation, at 
least over the short term . The cost-effectiveness of the CAA 
relative to new carbon legislation depends on important 
details . If EPA adopts flexible, multisector ESPS that sur-
vives legal challenge, initial CAA cost-effectiveness could 
be similar to that of a carbon price . This is less likely if the 
CAA is compared to new carbon price legislation, includ-
ing broad flexibility options like international emissions 
offsets (though many question the validity and verifiabil-
21 . See Gregory Wannier et al ., Prevailing Academic View on Compliance Flex-
ibility Under §111 of the Clean Air Act, RFF Discussion Paper 11-29 (July 
2011), available at http://www .rff .org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-11-29 .
pdf .
22 . See Dallas Burtraw et al ., Retail Electricity Price Savings From Compliance 
Flexibility in GHG Standards for Stationary Sources, 42 Energy Pol’y 67 
(2012) .
23 . For a detailed discussion of flexibility options available (and not available) 
under the CAA, see Nathan Richardson, Playing Without Aces: Offsets and 
the Limits of Flexibility Under Clean Air Act Climate Policy, 42 Envtl . L . 
735 (2012) .
24 . For example, firms may choose not to take cost-effective actions to comply 
with ESPS if they fear it will trigger costly NSR .
25 . See Nathan Richardson et al ., The Return of an Old and Battle-Tested Friend, 
The Clean Air Act, 176 Resources (2010), http://www .rff .org/Publications/
Resources/Pages/The-Return-of-an-Old-Battle-Tested-Friend-176 .aspx 
(last visited May 2, 2014) .
Copyright © 2014 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
6-2014 NEWS & ANALYSIS 44 ELR 10479
ity of such offsets) . Over the long term, however, the cost-
effectiveness advantages of new carbon legislation are likely 
to predominate .
Questions to ask:
•	 Will regulation of existing sources under the CAA be 
flexible, allowing trading between emitters? Will it 
allow trading between sectors?
•	 Does the legislative proposal provide flexibility, such 
as international offsets, not available under the CAA?
•	 If new legislation is not passed now, how long 
will CAA alternatives remain in place? In other 
words, when will carbon legislation again be 
politically plausible?
B. Scope
A carbon price could, in principle, cover all GHG emis-
sions throughout the U .S . economy . This has two advan-
tages . First and most obviously, only covered sources have 
an incentive to reduce their emissions . Second, the broader 
the scope, the greater the availability of opportunities to 
reduce emissions at low cost on the part of both producers 
and consumers . A broader scope means greater emissions 
reductions at a given price, or a lower price for a given level 
of emissions reductions .
The scope of the CAA is more limited, however . Some 
sectors, such as agriculture, are largely outside the reach 
of the CAA because they are neither mobile nor station-
ary sources according to CAA definitions . Such “non-
point” sources may also be difficult to reach with a carbon 
price mechanism because emissions are hard to measure 
and track—a carbon price embedded in fuel and fertilizer 
prices helps, but some practices, such as tilling and feed-
lots, are hard to reach with price incentives .
Also, the CAA generally requires a sector-by-sector 
approach . EPA must develop, propose, review comments, 
finalize, and implement performance standards or other 
regulation for each sector . These must each also survive any 
related litigation . EPA has broad authority to define sec-
tors, but excessively broad definitions are impractical and 
possibly illegal . This means that it will take many years 
before the scope of CAA-driven climate policy can match 
that of new carbon legislation, even if the maximum scope 
of both is similar in principle .
On the other hand, EPA has already moved to regu-
late one of the two largest sectors (road vehicles) and is 
on the path toward regulating the other (fossil electric 
power) . Together, these sectors account for the majority 
of U .S . emissions (about 67%) .26 Only if very low-cost 
emissions-reduction opportunities are available in other 
sectors will incorporating them change the cost and/or 
26 . U .S . EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks, EPA 430-
R-12-001 (2012), available at http://www .epa .gov/climatechange/Down-
loads/ghgemissions/US-GHG-Inventory-2012-Main-Text .pdf .
amount of achievable reductions very much . However, 
under CAA regulation, no trading between these two 
sectors is possible . Because their marginal cost of emis-
sions reduction is almost certainly different, this reduces 
cost-effectiveness .
As noted above, new carbon legislation could access 
international offsets . Doing so effectively increases the 
scope of the policy, accessing even cheaper emissions 
reductions than are available in any sector of the economy .
Questions to ask:
•	 How broad is the scope of the carbon legislation? Is 
it economywide or does it cover only major emit-
ting sectors?
•	 Has EPA shown willingness to regulate sectors 
beyond fossil electric power and road vehicles? (To 
date, it has only expressed an intent to regulate petro-
leum refineries, but not other sectors, and recent 
indications are that even refinery standards may be 
put off indefinitely .27)
C. Stringency
Congress is free to set whatever emissions cap or carbon 
tax level it wants to . The CAA also does not specify strin-
gency . Instead, it establishes goals or targets based on 
health or welfare, and requires EPA to regulate adequately 
to meet them . In some programs, such as NAAQS, these 
requirements are ultimately driven by scientific judgments 
based on health or welfare effects . Other provisions require 
technology-based standards . For the CAA programs most 
relevant to GHG regulation (CAFE and NSPS/ESPS), 
EPA has relatively broader discretion over stringency . In 
contrast to health- or welfare-based CAA programs, the 
Agency is permitted to consider technical feasibility, com-
pliance costs, the “remaining useful life” of sources, and, 
presumably, overall program cost-effectiveness . However, 
like all Agency decisions, EPA action under the CAA must 
fall within the bounds of reasonableness given the limita-
tions of its statutory authority .
This flexibility means there is relatively little a priori 
basis for separating new carbon legislation from CAA 
regulation on stringency grounds . Neither pathway will 
necessarily lead to a weak or strong policy; ultimately, any 
judgment will have to be based on the specific program/
legislation . The policy goal should be compliance costs 
approximately equal to the expected marginal damages 
from carbon emissions . This is relatively easy to assess for 
a carbon tax because the tax rate can be compared to an 
27 . See Environmentalists End Bid for Refinery Climate NSPS as EPA Delays 
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estimate of marginal damage .28 EPA conducts cost-benefit 
analysis of its major regulations, but the resulting standards 
may be influenced by factors other than damage estimates .
Question to ask:
•	 How stringent is new carbon legislation, relative to 
what EPA requires (or will require) from CAA-reg-
ulated sectors? Do compliance costs of either policy 
better approximate estimated marginal damages?
D. Revenue
The primary reason why new carbon legislation—in most 
accounts, a carbon tax—is viewed as politically plausible 
in the near term is the fact that it can raise a lot of revenue: 
$120 billion annually for a $25/ton tax .29 This revenue 
could be used to reduce budget deficits, to fund desired 
or needed government activity, or to replace other taxes 
with distortionary effects on the economy . A cap-and-trade 
program would also generate revenue if allowances are auc-
tioned, rather than freely allocated . Even if environmental 
benefits are the driving reason for new legislation, generat-
ing revenue is a valuable side benefit . Opinions vary greatly 
on the best use of revenue, with deficit reduction, replace-
ment of distortionary taxes, or rebates directly to citizens 
the most frequently advocated options . But all agree that 
government revenue is an important benefit and an advan-
tage of policy options that produce it .
EPA regulation under the CAA cannot generate federal 
revenue . Congress did not delegate its tax power to the 
Agency in the statute (and, historically, has almost never 
made such a delegation) . EPA does have authority to issue 
fines for failure to comply with its regulations, but this 
power probably could not be used to “tax” emissions . EPA 
also almost certainly lacks authority to auction permits for 
a cap-and-trade system . In short, EPA cannot create a car-
bon tax, and if its regulations involve tradable permits or 
allowances, those allowances will almost certainly be given 
away freely (grandfathered) to regulated emitters .
States with implementation authority under CAA pro-
grams like ESPS may generate revenue—they have inde-
pendent authority and are not limited by the CAA in this 
regard . For the same reason, however, states do not need 
CAA regulation to raise revenue with carbon policy, as 
illustrated by California’s use of revenue-generating auc-
tions as part of its cap-and-trade program . In fact, new 
legislation setting a national carbon price could erode rev-
enues from these state-level climate policies .30
28 . Estimating marginal damages of carbon emissions is hard, but no more so 
for either policy .
29 . See Ray Kopp et al ., Considering a Carbon Tax: Frequently Asked Questions, 
Resources for the Future (2012), available at http://www .rff .org/centers/cli-
mate_and_electricity_policy/pages/carbon_tax_faqs .aspx#Q2 .
30 . See Lawrence H . Goulder & Robert N . Stavins, Challenges From State—
Federal Interactions in U.S. Climate Change Policy, 101 Am . Econ . Rev . 
253 (2011) . For more on interactions between a carbon tax and state-level 
climate policies, see Dallas Burtraw & Karen Palmer, Mixing It Up: Power 
In summary, a national carbon tax will generate rev-
enue . A cap-and-trade program might . CAA regulation 
cannot generate federal revenue . States can generate rev-
enue from climate policies whether or not carbon is regu-
lated under the CAA, though this ability may be undercut 
by a national carbon price or incompatible EPA regulation .
Question to ask:
•	 Does new carbon legislation generate new revenue 
and do something useful with it?
E. Administrative Simplicity
A carbon tax could be very simple to administer, especially 
a carbon tax on upstream sources of carbon emissions . A 
relatively small number of oil and gas, industrial, and elec-
tric generation firms are responsible directly or indirectly 
for the large majority of U .S . emissions . The U .S . Treasury 
already administers tax systems covering coal mines and 
oil and natural gas producers, so the adoption of a carbon 
tax administered by Treasury on these energy producers 
would be relatively straightforward .
A carbon price is not necessarily simple, however . A cap-
and-trade system might or might not be administratively 
complex, depending on its design . And either a carbon tax 
or a cap-and-trade program could be burdened with com-
plex carve-outs and concessions to special interests, such as 
allowance allocation schemes or tax exemptions, that not 
only make it more difficult to administer, but reduce its 
cost-effectiveness and/or capacity to generate revenue .
CAA regulation will certainly be quite complex, how-
ever . As described above, many programs under the Act 
are applicable to different classes of sources . Each requires 
multiple rulemakings, and each is likely to be litigated . 
Implementing regulations for even a single group of sec-
tors takes years—longer if delayed by litigation . EPA has 
limited resources and must therefore proceed sequentially . 
Each regulation also creates ongoing administrative bur-
dens not only for EPA, but also for the states, which share 
in implementation of most CAA regulations . In particu-
lar, assessing the equivalency of various state policies with 
ESPS guidelines set by EPA will be a difficult and burden-
some process for both EPA and the states .
Moreover, regulation that works well in theory may not 
work well in practice, at least initially . Regulators and regu-
lated firms learn from experience, developing both institu-
tions and relationships . Litigation over regulation develops 
precedents that guide future regulation .
For CAA regulation, some of this work has already 
been done . CAFE standards, for example, are well-under-
stood by both regulators and the auto industry . On the 
other hand, key parts of CAA climate regulation are not 
yet well-understood . ESPS have only rarely been issued in 
the past, and only for relatively small classes of emitters . 
Sector Energy and Regional and Regulatory Climate Policies in the Presence of a 
Carbon Tax, RFF Discussion Paper 13-09 (2013) .
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Implementing standards for a large sector like fossil elec-
tric power will be a challenge requiring cooperation among 
EPA, states, and regulated firms . Making this system flex-
ible also means making it more complex .
Regulators will eventually work through these chal-
lenges—probably with the help of the courts—and the 
resulting regulatory structure is likely to involve separate 
trading approaches in some select sectors with technology-
based standards in others .
Questions to ask:
•	 Is the new legislative proposal relatively simple and 
easy to administer, or is it burdened with complex 
programs and carve-outs for different sectors?
•	 Are the agencies charged with administering the car-
bon price proposal capable of doing so effectively?
F. Litigation and Legal Risk
New carbon legislation faces very little legal risk—only a 
finding that such legislation is unconstitutional could pre-
vent its implementation, and such a finding has no appar-
ent basis . In other words, Congress clearly has the authority 
to tax and regulate GHG emissions .
Equally clearly, the CAA gives EPA regulatory author-
ity over GHG emissions . The Supreme Court’s holding in 
Massachusetts confirms this . But the limits of that author-
ity, and some entire programs likely to be used by EPA to 
regulate carbon, are untested . And almost every step the 
Agency has taken to date has been subjected to legal chal-
lenge . This will certainly continue .
Litigation of CAA regulation offers a win-win outcome 
for rent seekers . First, as discussed briefly above, it is likely 
to delay EPA regulation—litigation increases the adminis-
trative costs to EPA of developing regulation, and can delay 
its implementation . Even if individual regulations are not 
stayed during litigation, uncertainty over the outcome of 
cases may lead EPA to delay further steps, such as similar 
regulation on other sectors .
Second, EPA regulations may be overturned by courts . 
EPA may overreach and/or misinterpret the CAA, leading 
it to waste effort developing regulations that courts eventu-
ally overturn or that the Agency must modify . Though our 
analysis and that of others lead us to believe that CAA tools 
can be quite broad and flexible, it is possible that courts 
will disagree . Legal analysis of ESPS under §111(d) of the 
statute, however convincing it may appear, has not been 
tested in court because that section of the statute has only 
rarely been used . Some other elements of a CAA approach 
are similarly untested .
These legal risks are a significant threat to efficient 
(cost-effective) CAA climate policy . They can be mitigated 
if EPA takes a conservative approach, but doing so may 
mean less-flexible, less-stringent, or simply less regula-
tion . Another approach is to be bold in interpreting CAA 
authority, but to make the most legally risky parts of rule-
makings severable, so that adverse results in court do not 
force the Agency to start from scratch .
Question to ask:
•	 Do the president and EPA appear willing to accept 
legal risks associated with building a flexible and 
cost-effective regulatory program?
G. Updating Environmental Goals Over Time
Because of the cumulative nature of global warming gases 
and the increase in global population and economic wealth 
over time, emissions of GHGs in future years are likely to 
impose larger damages than do current emissions . Thus, 
one can identify an optimal path of increasing carbon 
prices to address the projected increase in damages with 
emissions in future years . In addition, policy is never made 
with complete information . Over time, and with experi-
ence, the quality of information improves . For environ-
mental policy, better science leads to better knowledge 
of risks, and additional economic data results in a better 
understanding of compliance costs . Updating policies to 
reflect new information will therefore make them better 
and more cost-effective . Policies that are not updated can 
become stagnant, overcome by changing reality and even 
by other policies . Thus, a policy that, at its outset, envisions 
updating to reflect new information on climate risks and 
compliance costs has clear advantages .
For example, the Title IV SO2 trading program created 
by the 1990 Amendments to the CAA has been widely 
acclaimed as a great success, with substantial cost savings 
compared to more traditional regulation . Although the 
SO2 program yielded a substantial cost-effective reduction 
in SO2 emissions from electric power plants, new infor-
mation on the health benefits of reducing SO2 emissions 
emerging in the 1990s suggested that further significant 
emissions reductions would yield additional benefits that 
substantially exceeded the costs of further control . In 
short, more-stringent regulation than required by Title IV 
was justified . But the Title IV program was a unique cre-
ation of Congress—it delegated little discretion to EPA . 
In particular, EPA could not change the stringency of the 
program in response to this new information . Instead, 
EPA used other CAA provisions to adopt a more stringent 
SO2 emissions cap for plants in the eastern United States . 
Although the resulting regulatory programs achieved fur-
ther reductions in emissions, the judicial and regulatory 
decisions associated with the last eight years of litigation 
have undermined the Title IV trading system . One pos-
sible lesson from this experience is that Congress should 
provide some mechanism for updating legislated regula-
tory programs in response to new information .
For many of the regulatory provisions in the CAA, 
EPA serves as an expert Agency with authority to assess 
and respond to new information . In particular, the NSPS 
and ESPS programs must be regularly updated on a sched-
Copyright © 2014 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
44 ELR 10482 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 6-2014
ule set by statute . In fact, the sector-by-sector approach 
required by the CAA implies at least some updating, as 
each successive sector is regulated based on the best avail-
able information at the time . If EPA does not adequately 
base regulations on the best available information, or does 
not reassess its regulations in light of new information, it 
can be sued . CAA-driven climate policy is therefore better 
equipped to adapt to the new information that will surely 
become available than simple carbon price legislation, like 
a fixed, unchanging carbon tax .
EPA is often slow to react, however—it has often failed 
to meet the eight-year schedule for updating NSPS . EPA 
action often comes only in response to petition or litiga-
tion . Over the medium to long term, political turnover in 
the executive branch can make EPA action unpredictable 
or inconsistent .
Congress is also slow to revise environmental regula-
tion . The last significant update to the CAA was in 1990, 
and before that, 1977 . If Congress is able to break the dead-
lock and pass carbon tax legislation, the resulting legisla-
tion could be in place without revision for a long time . The 
likelihood, based on past experience, that Congress will be 
unwilling or unable to revise legislation should be taken 
into account when evaluating any legislation . To address 
this issue, the legislation can provide for updating .
Since climate policy will probably require midcourse 
corrections, then delegation to an expert agency offers 
one way to achieve updating . Thus, Congress could pass a 
carbon tax and delegate to the implementing agency (e .g ., 
Treasury) the authority to adjust the tax rate, dependent 
on new scientific and economic information . Or, authority 
to revise the policy could be delegated to a new, indepen-
dent institution . However, such a delegation is probably 
unlikely—the power to tax is closely held .
If Congress is unwilling to delegate the authority to 
modify the tax rate, it could instead include automatic trig-
gers in the legislation . The tax rate/cap level could change 
over time at a rate specified in the statute, approximat-
ing assumptions about future information . Policy change 
could be automatically triggered by objective, observable 
facts: it could become more stringent if atmospheric GHG 
concentrations exceed a certain level, or less stringent if 
economic growth falls below or unemployment exceeds a 
set point . Or it could be set at a lower level (e .g ., at a level 
equal to the domestic cost of carbon), but ramp up to a 
more-stringent level (e .g ., a level equal to the global social 
cost of carbon) if other countries adopt climate policies . 
One could surely devise other options .
Including such triggers may make it more difficult to 
pass legislation—for example, antitax advocate Grover 
Norquist withdrew his initial acceptance of a revenue-
neutral carbon tax after concluding that, once created, it 
would undoubtedly increase over time (presumably with-
out reductions in other taxes that would preserve its rev-
enue neutrality) . An automatic updating provision would 
only add to this concern . On the other hand, the associated 
political opposition of including such a provision is prob-
ably easier to overcome than the inertia associated with 
reopening and renegotiating settled law in the future in 
response to new information, as would eventually be neces-
sary under a fixed carbon tax .
To be sure, a future Congress could override automatic 
or delegated policy changes . But updating mechanisms 
shift the default rule for policy updates . Instead of relying 
on Congress to update policy in reaction to new informa-
tion, Congress must act to prevent such updates . Given 
recent experience, congressional inaction seems more likely 
than congressional overreaction . In any case, Congress 
could override not only future policy changes included 
in new legislation, but also the authority to update that 
has already been delegated to EPA . Congress can always 
change the law .
If updating mechanisms are included, a CAA approach 
is no longer inherently superior in terms of its ability to 
adjust to new information, and the choice of policy path-
way must depend on other considerations .
Question to ask:
•	 Does the proposed carbon legislation include mech-
anisms for updating stringency in response to new 
information, or does stringency at least increase 
over time?
H. Capture and Political Compromise
Any policy is vulnerable to capture by special interests or 
to being undermined by political horse-trading . A cap-
and-trade system with allowance handouts to politically 
powerful industries, or a carbon tax that excludes those 
same industries, will be less cost-effective than a clean and 
simple blackboard-ideal policy . Of course, some degree of 
political compromise is probably necessary .31 How much, 
and the extent to which those compromises will damage 
policy effectiveness, is hard to say .
But EPA is also sensitive to political pressure and 
rent-seeking . Congressional opposition to its proposals is 
important because Congress is responsible for its annual 
appropriations . Congress could even move to strip EPA 
of its authority to regulate GHGs without replacing that 
authority with new climate legislation . Bills that would 
do so have already been introduced and have passed the 
House . Though they have failed in the Senate, they have 
attracted some Democratic support . Presidential signature 
or a veto-proof majority would ultimately be required, 
but either is possible in the future . Any carbon regula-
tions implemented already by EPA could be invalidated 
by such legislation . This is an important source of risk for 
a CAA approach .
Of course, any legislation, including a new law creating 
a carbon price, could be revised or repealed by a future 
31 . This observation has led Robert Stavins to argue in favor of a cap-and-trade 
system over a carbon tax because necessary political compromises will not 
affect its environmental effectiveness .
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Congress . But it is politically more difficult to repeal recent 
legislation than an old law, like the CAA .
Politically powerful interests may also be able to exert 
influence on EPA directly . EPA is part of the executive 
branch, led by a president who is sensitive to his/her politi-
cal constituencies and to the political effects of agency deci-
sions . Future presidents may be able to reverse or modify 
Agency CAA climate rules more easily than future Con-
gresses can repeal or modify legislation simply by directing 
EPA to loosen or eliminate those regulations (though some 
evidence that doing so is reasonable would be required) .
Moreover, even final EPA decisions can be challenged in 
court . Although, in theory, courts should adjudicate these 
suits without regard to the political power of the plaintiff, 
in reality, politically and financially powerful interests are 
more likely to have the resources and desire to litigate . 
And even if they are not successful, the process of litiga-
tion itself can delay regulation, and the threat of litigation 
can lead regulators to be less ambitious . Finally, the many 
separate rulemakings over an extended period required for 
EPA climate regulation results in many opportunities for 
political influence .32
The best course is to evaluate carefully the inevitable 
compromises included in any particular carbon legislation 
and to weigh those compromises with the likely alternative 
outcome under CAA regulation .
Questions to ask:
•	 What political compromises to favored industries or 
interests are included in new carbon legislation?
•	 How much do those compromises reduce the cost-
effectiveness of the program vis-à-vis CAA regulation?
•	 What is the likelihood that Congress will strip EPA 
authority over GHGs or that the next president will 
undo regulatory actions that have been taken?
I. International Competitiveness and Emissions 
Leakage
One drawback of unilateral climate policy is that it can 
damage the competitiveness of U .S . firms that compete 
globally, with adverse effects on growth and job creation in 
the United States . This can also erode environmental ben-
efits, as firms in countries without climate policy increase 
production and, therefore, their emissions .33
The academic literature suggests that leakage and adverse 
competitive effects from a small carbon tax are likely to be 
modest . Nevertheless, pressure to include measures aimed 
at mitigating these effects in any policy proposal may 
be considerable . For example, firms in energy-intensive, 
trade-exposed (EITE) sectors might be wholly or par-
32 . On the other hand, this requires special interests to spread their resources, 
possibly reducing their long-term effectiveness .
33 . Reduced U .S . fuel consumption leads to lower global fuel prices, with simi-
lar leakage effects .
tially exempted from compliance responsibilities or might 
receive compensating subsidies . Or “border adjustments” 
(tariffs) could be imposed on trade with countries that lack 
equivalent climate policies—though these are internation-
ally controversial and possibly illegal under trade law .
Such measures could be included in any new carbon 
legislation . Although such direct measures are unavailable 
under the CAA, EPA could, and probably would, adjust 
the stringency of its regulation to account for competitive-
ness and leakage effects .
The sector-by-sector nature of CAA regulation not only 
allows but requires the Agency to treat sectors differently . 
Many CAA programs, including ESPS, allow the Agency 
to consider compliance costs in setting regulation . This 
may extend to international competitiveness consider-
ations . Leakage is an environmental issue that EPA would 
be likely to consider . Even the order in which EPA regu-
lates sectors is relevant here—by regulating EITE sectors 
last, EPA effectively excludes them from compliance duties 
for a time .
Congress has more and better tools for dealing with 
competitiveness and leakage than EPA does . But EPA is 
not required to ignore them .
Questions to ask:
•	 If needed, does new carbon legislation include mea-
sures for reducing leakage and competitiveness losses 
in EITE industries?
•	 Are these measures overly broad, compromising the 
effectiveness of the policy?
J. International Signals
Climate change is a global problem, and reducing emis-
sions of the GHGs that cause it is a global responsibility . 
The United States, one of the largest emitters, has been 
slower than most other developed economies to commit to 
emissions reductions . Doing so would provide an impor-
tant signal and could influence other countries to follow 
suit through bi- or multilateral agreements .
But this signal depends on the strength and clarity of 
U .S . action . If U .S . policy is relatively weak, or is perceived 
to be so, it will not be influential . Similarly, if U .S . policy 
is meaningful but difficult to understand, other countries 
may undervalue it . The CAA is available off-the-shelf with 
powerful, flexible tools to achieve significant emissions 
reductions over the next decade . But the CAA is a com-
plicated statute, especially for those with little experience 
with American law . It is incremental, technocratic, and 
relatively difficult to explain and understand . On the other 
hand, EPA does estimate and monitor emissions reductions 
associated with its regulations, and this monitoring—so 
long as it is credible—may make understanding the details 
of U .S . regulation less important .
In any event, regulating sector-by-sector, over time 
makes it harder to make credible emissions reduction com-
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mitments . Even if CAA regulation is quite stringent, it may 
be harder to convince foreign negotiators that it will lead to 
more significant emissions reductions than it would be to 
convince them under new legislation with relatively mod-
est goals—though of course new legislation might itself be 
complex and difficult to evaluate .
Because climate change is a global problem requiring 
global limits on GHG emissions, unilateral action by the 
United States will achieve only limited benefits in the 
absence of substantial global GHG reductions . One advan-
tage of a legislated program like a carbon tax is that it can 
be structured to achieve initially only modest reductions 
in GHGs and provide for a ramping up to more-stringent 
emission reductions only if other countries also agree to 
achieve commensurate reductions in GHG emissions . This 
structure in a legislated program would both provide a sig-
nal and offer an incentive for further international agree-
ment to limit GHG emissions . A CAA regulatory program 
probably cannot be structured in a similar way to ramp up 
the stringency in a way that is directly tied to international 
agreements to restrict GHG emissions .34
Questions to ask:
•	 Does new carbon legislation provide a ready basis for 
international negotiations?
•	 Will other countries be able to understand and value 
CAA climate policy? Are other countries taking a 
sector-by-sector, industry-by-industry regulatory 
approach that parallels CAA regulation?
V. Conclusions
CAA provides the set of tools being used today to build 
climate policy at the federal level . New carbon legislation 
might be politically possible, and the prospects for such 
legislation appear to be greater over the long term .
New legislation has important advantages . The CAA is 
an old statute and was not designed with climate problems 
in mind or, with a few limited exceptions, with an appreci-
ation of the ability of market mechanisms to address envi-
ronmental problems cost-effectively . In comparison, new 
legislation setting a carbon price would almost certainly be 
built around cost-effective market mechanisms . It could be 
simpler to administer and broader in scope, could access 
international emissions either through offsets or by moti-
vating negotiations, and it could raise revenue . In addition, 
new carbon legislation could have symbolic advantages in 
34 . The CAA generally directs EPA to regulate so as to protect health and/
or welfare, not to strategically influence other countries’ environmen-
tal regulations .
that it could send a strong and unmistakable signal that 
the United States is addressing climate change . For these 
reasons and others, an ideal carbon policy would certainly 
reduce emissions at lower cost than a regulatory approach, 
especially over the long term .
But new legislation will not be ideal, and the CAA 
should not be underestimated . It is a flexible set of tools 
that, though not perfect, has been proven effective by expe-
rience . It might be less vulnerable to being compromised 
by inefficient political capture and horse-trading . Rela-
tive to a simple carbon tax, an important advantage is the 
ability of expert agencies to update regulation over time 
to respond to new information about environmental risks 
and economic costs . In short, the CAA works today, can be 
adapted to fit the climate problem relatively well, and can 
evolve over time .
So, should the statute in the hand be traded for the 
one in the bush? It depends . Ideal carbon legislation—an 
administratively simple, economywide, uniform price, set 
at a level approximating marginal damages from carbon 
emissions, without handouts to politically powerful indus-
tries, and with a robust mechanism for updating the cap 
or tax in response to new information—would be superior 
to the current CAA . But such ideal legislation is extremely 
unlikely in reality .
Until we know what compromises are necessary to get 
carbon legislation through Congress, it is impossible to say 
in the abstract whether it is wise to give up existing regu-
latory tools . Even once we do know what form of carbon 
legislation is on the table, the choice will not be easy—not 
only because judgment calls are difficult and may come 
down to personal priorities, but also because comparative 
evaluation is extremely complex . We only hope here to 
have supplied the right questions to ask once such a pro-
posal emerges .
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